INTRODUCTION
Taken at face value, the foregoing statements demonstrate an incongruence between the federal Constitution and most states' criminal codes. If the government convicts a citizen under the tax evasion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 4 some state disenfranchisement laws preclude that citizen-now a felon-from voting. ' This Comment argues that courts should construe the Amendment narrowly to permit the disenfranchisement of tax felons-even though the Twenty-fourth Amendment's plain language precludes states from disenfranchising tax felons for federal elections. Part I defines federal tax evasion and demonstrates that nonpayment of tax constitutes an essential element of the crime. Parts II and III elaborate a tension between felon disenfranchisement laws and the Twentyfourth Amendment. Part II establishes the broad constitutionality of state felon disenfranchisement provisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, while Part III elucidates the categorical unconstitutionality of federal election poll taxes under the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Part IV addresses the crux of this tension: whether income taxes fall within the scope of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's phrase "poll tax or other tax." Analysis of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's plain language and drafting history indicates that "poll tax or other tax" should be read broadly, as including income taxes. Part V elucidates a tension between this interpretation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and current and past social understandings about the Amendment's function. To ameliorate this tension, this Comment proposes that courts employ a "preliminary frame" that guides the application of conventional interpretive modes. This preliminary frame indicates that the Twentyfourth Amendment should be read narrowly, as not affecting tax felon disenfranchisement. Part VI concludes by speculating on the broader applicability of preliminary frames to other parts of the Constitution.
I. THE FEDERAL TAX EVASION STATUTE
The federal tax evasion statute, 26 USC § 7201, states that " [a] ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony." If § 7201 punishes not the failure to pay tax but instead a criminal intent to "willfully" defraud the government, then felony tax evasion may fall out of the ambit of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, which proscribes the denial of the vote "by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." Such a reading of § 7201 eliminates any constitutional issues involving the Twenty-fourth Amendment."
Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U Chi
Legal F 315,327-30 (arguing that income taxes are not "qualitatively different" from poll taxes).
11 See Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22, 62 (1932) (stating that statutes should be constructed to avoid constitutional questions if possible).
Courts, however, have read the willfulness requirement of § 7201 to interpose only a nominal mens rea between the nonpayment of taxes and a felony conviction. This limited mens rea indicates that the failure to pay tax constitutes the heart of the federal evasion felony-and forces the constitutional question.
Section 7201 describes three elements for the crime of tax evasion. First, a defendant must actually owe tax. 2 Second, the defendant must have performed "an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of [that] tax."' 3 Finally, the defendant must have acted "willfully."' 4 The Supreme Court has interpreted "willfully," as used in § 7201, to denote "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."' 5 This definition, however, mandates no "bad faith," "evil intent," or proof of motive.1 6 Because "a voluntary, intentional violation" does not require a defendant's affirmative desire to deprive the government of tax receipts, the intent prong of the willfulness requirement essentially depends on mere knowledge of a tax obligation.
If a defendant subjectively knows of a nonspecific legal duty to pay tax, any attempt to evade payment is voluntary and intentional. Substituting knowledge for intent essentially foregrounds the act of nonpayment at the expense of the specific intent not to pay.
Section 7201's actus reus requirement also indicates that the essence of tax evasion is the nonpayment of tax-not the willful intent to defraud the government. Just as courts have read only a minimal mens rea into § 7201, the provision's "affirmative act" element captures almost any positive gesture that enables tax evasion. Indeed, the same circumstantial evidence may prove both the mens rea and 20 Whether a defendant has paid tax does not bear on criminality under § 7206; instead, the intent to defraud is central." If § 7201 dealt centrally with a defendant's intent to defraud the government, then § 7201 would cover essentially the same crimes as § 7206, but with the additional element of tax due and owing. For § 7201 and § 7206 to describe distinct offenses, § 7201 must depend heavily on the nonpayment of tax, the element that differentiates it from § 7206. Because the nonpayment of tax constitutes the core of § 7201 tax evasion, a tension remains between the Twenty-fourth Amendment and disenfranchisement laws that include federal tax felons.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The Twenty-fourth Amendment notwithstanding, states may constitutionally deny the vote to federal tax felons. This Part argues that the Supreme Court has deemed felon disenfranchisement laws presumptively valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, state and federal courts have indicated that income tax felonies are sufficient to trigger disenfranchisement. Only when a specific disenfranchisement statute violates the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial discrimination have courts declared such statutes unconstitutional. Because tax felon disenfranchisement almost certainly does not reflect racial bias, such disenfranchisement laws are permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions-though not necessarily under the Twenty-fourth Amendment's strictures. 
A. Strict Scrutiny and Felon Disenfranchisement
In Richardson v Ramirez,2 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment grants an "affirmative sanction" to state criminal disenfranchisement laws.3 The three Ramirez plaintiffs, all convicted felons who had "completed the service of their respective sentences and paroles," challenged a California constitutional provision that categorically denied the franchise to both felons and exfelons." 4 This provision reflected a tradition at both common and civil law that allowed governments to deem a convicted criminal "dead in law" and thus unable to perform "any legal function-including, of course, voting." ' The Ramirez Court explicitly considered the narrow issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment abrogated the California constitution's disenfranchisement provision-and, by implication, whether that Amendment also vitiated the corollary rule at historical common law.
The Ramirez plaintiffs argued that California's felon disenfranchisement provisions denied them "the equal protection of the laws" in contravention of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In prior decisions, the Court used the principle of one-person, one-vote to strictly scrutinize laws that restricted individuals' access to the ballot." To survive strict scrutiny, a voting regulation must be necessary to realize a Rehnquist's view, best "addressed to the legislative forum," which can "properly weigh and balance" all competing considerations." But there are limits to this legislative deference. First, lower courts subject disenfranchisement provisions to rational basis review. Second, substantive constraints exist. Ramirez discusses only felonies and infamous crimes, which are both terms of art used in state disenfranchisement provisions, and these categories imply an endogenous limit to the strict scrutiny exception effected by § 2)' Third, the Supreme Court has discerned a carve-out to the Ramirez rule if states enact disenfranchisement laws with a racially discriminatory purpose. Notwithstanding these constraints, federal tax felonies almost certainly remain valid triggering offenses for state disenfranchisement provisions.
Rational basis review.
In the wake of Ramirez, lower courts have analyzed the content of felon disenfranchisement laws using a rational basis test." Such attention to political theory, broad Constitutional principles, or social norms."). See also Gabriel J. Chin See Wesley, 791 F2d at 1261-62 ("[ilt can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases."), quoting Green, 380 F2d at 451 (Friendly). This rationale tracks two of the four reasons for disenfranchisement rejected by Note, 102 Harv L Rev at 1303,1307-09 (cited in note 39): "to guard against voter fraud" and to ensure "moral competence." violated judicial constructions of the social contract. On this version of social contract, the state is not obligated to respect the rights of those that undermine the state's ability to maintain the social contract." 2 By promoting both classical liberal and civic republican political purposes, tax felon disenfranchisement represents a reasonable means to eliminate "threat[s] to the integrity of the elective process." 4 3
State disenfranchisement provisions most likely also survive heightened rational basis review, or "rational basis with bite."" Under heightened rational basis review, courts weigh a state's explicitly asserted interests (as opposed to possible interests) against the harms those provisions wreak on the rights of individuals from groups "approaching quasi-suspect status." 5 In the case of tax felon disenfranchisement, states' asserted "purity of the ballot box" rationales for enacting disenfranchisement provisions match the best possible justification under ordinary rational basis review. Heightened rational basis review therefore collapses into ordinary rational basis review, and the outcome -favoring the state-will almost certainly be the same.
This situation differs markedly from canonical heightened rational basis cases in which the Court deemed the government's asserted interests spurious and tangential to the rights infringed.4" In addition, tax felons, as a group, do not approach quasi-suspect status. Under a contractarian theory of disenfranchisement, citizens become felons through elective criminal acts that directly (and justly) implicate the abrogation of political rights. Unlike laws parsing individuals based on disability, citizenship, or sexual orientation, tax felon disenfranchise- (abrogating a zoning ordinance that "rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded" after dismissing the municipality's reasons for the ordinance); Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 227-30 (1982) (finding that the alleged government interests failed to provide a rational basis for a statute denying public education to illegal alien children).
46 See Romer, 517 US at 635 ("The breadth of the [state constitutional] Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them."); Cleburne, 473 US at 450 (noting that the municipality's stated "concerns obviously fail[ed] to explain" the differential permitting scheme applied to homes for the "mentally retarded"); Plyler, 457 US at 230 ("It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries."). ment provisions demonstrate a direct link between the status-creating trigger and the differential treatment. Under either ordinary or heightened rational basis review, courts will almost certainly find the disenfranchisement of tax felons constitutional.
An alternate rational basis challenge to the substance of felon disenfranchisement laws involves whether those laws are overinclusive to the point of absurdity. ' Writing in dissent in Ramirez, Justice Marshall observed that seemingly minor crimes, such as "seduction under promise of marriage, or conspiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muffler," qualified as state law felonies. For these offenses to warrant the permanent revocation of an individual's voting rights was simply absurd, Marshall argued. 9 Four years before Ramirez, a New Jersey federal district court could "perceive no rational basis" in a similarly "irrational and inconsistent classification.""" Tax felons, however, lack standing to bring this type of claim. Because tax felonies illustrate a paradigmatic situation in which a legitimate state interest supports the prerogative to disenfranchise, tax felons are not harmed by disenfranchisement provisions irrational with respect to other, less egregious offenses." Were these absurd provisions remedied, tax felo- Ramirez, 418 US at 75 n 24 (Marshall dissenting), citing Otsuka, 414 P2d at 418 (Mosk) ("The unreasonableness of a classification disfranchising all former felons, regardless of their crime, is readily demonstrable.").
50
Stephens v Yeomans, 327 F Supp 1182, 1188 (D NJ 1970) (noting with opprobrium that under New Jersey law "[m]ost defrauders, including persons convicted of income tax fraud, remain eligible to vote"). See also Dillenburg, 469 F2d at 1225 (finding that offenses that trigger disenfranchisement "do not follow any perceivable pattern," but applying strict scrutiny to the classifications); Butts v Nichols, 381 F Supp 573, 580-82 & n 10 (DC Iowa 1974) (invalidating a statute that barred felons from municipal employment because it created "a totally irrational and inconsistent scheme"); Hobson, 434 F Supp at 366 (contending that no "rational reason" existed "to support the exclusion of wife beaters, while not excluding others convicted of assault and battery").
51 See United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21 (1960) ("[Olne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.").
[74:1549 nies still would fall within the realm of permissible disenfranchising infractions. Tax felonies represent the core, rather than the fringe, of crimes that warrant disenfranchisement, and therefore they are illsuited to challenges grounded in the absurdity of particular disenfranchisement provisions.
Felonies and infamous crimes.
Two substantive limits affect the scope of the strict scrutiny exception crafted by Rehnquist in Ramirez. First, Rehnquist posits that the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly contemplates "the exclusion of felons from the vote." ' 52 Second, Ramirez upheld a state constitutional provision that authorized the disenfranchisement of individuals "convicted of an infamous crime."" By implication, only triggering offenses that are felonies or infamous crimes benefit from the strict scrutiny exception. 4 Offenses that are neither felonies nor infamous crimes must survive a "fatal in fact" inquisition into the state interest behind the abrogation of the offender's fundamental voting rights.
5
The catalogue of felony offenses is defined by either a crime's statutory designation or its status at common law, or both." The spe- 52 Ramirez, 418 US at 54. Blackstone offers additional textual support for the interpretation of "other crimes" as referring to felonies. Quoting Coke, Blackstone notes that rebellion against government historically represented the quintessential felony. Williams Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *94-95 (Chicago 1979). If "participation in rebellion" is paradigmatic of the class of "other crime [s] ," then those other crimes are almost certainly felonies. Similarly, Blackstone lists "crimes and misdemeanors" as the two distinct categories of criminality. See id at *1, 5. Therefore, "crimes" may be synonymous with felonies.
53 418 US at 27 (quotation marks omitted 57 Although Rehnquist cites the post-Civil War enabling acts, which re-admitted the former Confederate states to the Union, as permitting disenfranchisement "as a punishment for such crimes as [were then] felonies at common law," Ramirez, 418 US at 51, this statement merely establishes historical practice and does not limit the holding to common law felonies. 3. Strict scrutiny and race.
Although Ramirez removes felon disenfranchisement laws from the heightened judicial scrutiny ordinarily accorded laws that limit voting rights, the decision does not foreclose strict scrutiny for those disenfranchisement laws that target a particular suspect class. In Hunter v Underwood, 0 the Court found felon disenfranchisement laws void if they have the purpose of furthering discrimination on the basis of race. 71 leaving intact a strong presumption of constitutionality for felon disenfranchisement statutes."
In Hunter, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Alabama disenfranchisement provision that allegedly affected blacks more than whites. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, employed the same holistic interpretive scheme that he used in Ramirez. Reading § § 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in tandem, Rehnquist stated that " § 2 was not designed to permit [ ] purposeful racial discrimination ... which otherwise violates § ."" In Ramirez, § 2 restricted the application of § 1; in Hunter, § 1 limited the scope of § 2. Because the Alabama disenfranchisement provision's triggering offenses included some petty and serious crimes "thought to be more commonly committed by blacks," such as "vagrancy, living in adultery, and wife beating," Rehnquist deemed the provision "original[ly] enact[ed] ... to discriminate against blacks on account of race" and therefore unconstitutional." Not only did Hunter delineate the outer bounds of states' discretion to disenfranchise felons, but the decision also made explicit a connection between a disenfranchisement law's triggering offenses and the legitimacy of that law's purpose. Lower courts, however, have interpreted Hunter as a principally procedural prohibition, and the deferential review advocated in Ramirez dominates courts' analysis of the substance of disenfranchisement laws. 7 5 For a disenfranchisement law to be deemed unconstitutional under Hunter, its history must display a clear legislative "intent to discriminate," and that forbidden intent must have altered the law's substance.1 6 Whether a disenfranchisement provision in practice produces racially disparate results does not affect its constitutionality." This distinction between iniquitous enactment and discriminatory effect appears starkest in the context of legislative re-enactments of racially motivated felon disenfranchisement provisions. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that such re-enactments, if well-deliberated and racially unbiased, overcome Hunter's intent test, regardless of any enduring racially disproportionate impact.7 The substance of the disenfranchisement provision may remain unchanged, as long as the formal procedures under which it was enacted no longer reflect racial bias. 9 Re-enactment therefore offers a means for state lawmakers to immunize state disenfranchisement provisions, in their entirety and at once, from invalidation under Hunter. In addition, the current federal tax felon statute, like these immunized state provisions, was enacted without discriminatory intent." Whether challenged under Hunter's exception to Ramirez, rational basis review, or the conceptual limits of the Ramirez exemption, the disenfranchisement of federal tax felons is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III. THE NARROW AND BROAD TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT
Courts have interpreted the Twenty-fourth Amendment to be simultaneously narrow and broad. The Amendment applies only to a narrow band of federal elections, namely "any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress." ' " ' But the Amendment's guarantee-that citizens' voting rights "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax""-is broad and categorical. Despite states' latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment to sculpt felon disenfranchisement laws, any curtailment of voting rights caused by a "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax" will fall under the Twentyfourth Amendment's guarantee. In a direct conflict between the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments, the Twenty-fourth, as the later in time, will prevail."
A. Narrowness
The Supreme Court has implicitly constructed the Twenty 
83
Compare US Const Amend XIX, § 1 (extending, in 1919, the franchise to women); US Const Amend XXVI, § 1 (guaranteeing, in 1971, the right to vote to U.S. citizens "who are eighteen years of age or older"), with US Const Amend XIV, § 2 (reducing states' representation for "den[ying the right to vote] to any of the male inhabitants of [a] state, being twenty-one years of age"). 84 The Additionally, Douglas cites as complements to Harper two precedents striking down voter qualifications in both state and federal elections.9 Harper thus appears to essentially obviate any practical need for the Twenty-fourth Amendment. 93 As one commentator puts it, "the net effect of the Twenty-fourth Amendment was, at most, to abolish the poll tax in federal elections, in a few states, two years before it would have been abolished across the board anyway." 9 Indeed, the 88 See Keyssar, The Right to Vote at 271 (cited in note 8) (noting, however, that "many Americans still believed that the dependent poor ought to remain disfranchised"). 
B. Breadth
Although the Twenty-fourth Amendment addresses only a discrete subset of elections, it creates a broad, absolute prohibition on voter qualifications that in any way implicate economic means.9 The Supreme Court's response to states' attempts to circumvent the poll tax ban illustrates a broad reading of the Twenty-fourth Amendment.
When the Twenty-fourth Amendment's ratification appeared inevitable, some states attempted to modify their poll tax statutes to comply with the Amendment. Virginia, for example, enacted a measure "whereby the federal voter could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months before the election."" The Court found such provisions unconstitutional in Harman v Forssenius. 9 ' Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren espoused an expansive version of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's rights guarantee, stating that:
For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder substitute may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon the federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional imgiven the Court's statement in Harper."). A second perspective is that Harper contravenes principles of constitutional interpretation by constructing the Fourteenth Amendment to reach conclusions precluded by the negative implications of the Twenty-fourth. See Cohens v Virginia, 19 US 264, 398 (1821) ("The Court [in construing a provision of the Constitution] may imply a negative from affirmative words where the implication promotes, but not where it defeats, the intention."). 95 The influence of these legal sources shows in their citation count: Harper is a well-cited opinion (842 citing decisions), while the Twenty-fourth Amendment has evoked a comparatively miniscule amount of jurisprudential production (a mere 11 citations; 1.3 percent of Harper's count). 98 380 US 528, 544 (1965) . Forssenius rests on the substantive scope of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's proscription because a mere procedural disjunction between state and federal election processes presents no constitutional problems. See Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112,125-26 (1970) (invalidating a congressional statute lowering the voting age to eighteen insofar as it applied to state elections but upholding it for federal elections), superseded by US Const Amend XXVI (1971) (lowering the voting age to eighteen in both state and federal elections). munity subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and must fall under its ban." Twenty-fourth Amendment poll taxes effectively include excises on individuals' time and convenience, if those costs represent the alternative to a cash tax. Warren notes that, "like the Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth nullifies sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of impairing the right guaranteed." ' "0 The rights created by the Twenty-fourth Amendment cannot be "indirectly denied."' ' . This broad reading of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's rights guarantee elevates the substance and effect of statutory voting requirements over their mere form.'02
The textual hook for the Forssenius rule is that the Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibits voting rights from being "denied or abridged" by the failure to pay a poll tax. Had the Amendment proscribed denial only, the state statute might have survived.'0 Under its actual, expansive verbiage, the Twenty-fourth Amendment bans poll tax schemes that "circumscribe or burden or impair or impede" voting rights." ' Courts have distinguished this kind of affirmative abrogation of voting rights from any fees or restitution payments required to reinstate those same rights, and such fees and restitution mandates are not unconstitutional poll taxes.' 03 This limitation, however, does not apply to tax felon disenfranchisement because the tax felony provokes the curtailment of voting rights, rather than preventing their restoration. Although neither Forssenius nor any antecedent or subsequent lower court decisions discuss the scope of the phrase "other tax,"
'' 6 these cases read onto the Twenty-fourth Amendment a broad guarantee of substantive voting rights. If courts interpret the words "other tax" in a similarly expansive way, the formal separation of the federal income tax statute from state felon disenfranchisement provisions will not affect courts' construction of the laws' cumulative effect. The result if the two are coupled together-that nonpayment of federal income tax results in disenfranchisement-is all that matters.
IV. THE INCOME TAX AS A "POLL TAX OR OTHER TAX"
The Twenty-fourth Amendment's strong ban on poll taxes indicates that, if the federal income tax is a "poll tax or other tax," nonpayment under the federal tax evasion statute cannot constitutionally trigger disenfranchisement. ' Case law has clearly established that income taxes are not "poll tax [es] ." The plain meaning of the Twentyfourth Amendment's text indicates, however, that income taxes are almost certainly "other tax [es] ." The Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafting history reveals no intent that contravenes the Amendment's text. Therefore, the disenfranchisement of tax felons is facially unconstitutional under the Twenty-fourth Amendment.
A. Income Taxes as Poll Taxes "Income tax" connotes a different textual meaning than "poll tax," and courts have elaborated guidelines that distinguish the two. Although the Supreme Court has deemed both income taxes and poll taxes to be direct taxes," ' poll taxes are capitation taxes, while income taxes are assessed with reference to a person's "property, income, or ability to pay."" Furthermore, those with incomes below a minimum threshold pay no income tax or even receive payments from the Treasury Department.' 1° Poll taxes, by contrast, fall uniformly on each voter-and can be avoided by foregoing the right to vote."' As broad categories, income taxes and poll taxes are clearly distinct.
Marginal cases, however, blur the line between income taxes and poll taxes. For example, a state might enact a tax, due on voter registration, paid only by individuals earning income greater than a certain amount. This hypothetical tax almost certainly qualifies as an unconstitutional poll tax under Forssenius because it impairs citizens' exercise of the franchise," 2 but its gross structure resembles an income tax. This zone of uncertainty between poll taxes and income taxes is policed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment's phrase "or other tax."
B. Income Taxes as Other Taxes
The plain meaning of the words "or other tax" includes federal income taxes. Because the evasion (and consequent nonpayment) of income tax can result in disenfranchisement, state provisions that revoke voting rights based on federal income tax felonies violate the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Although the Amendment's text is dispositive, this interpretation is corroborated by the Amendment's drafting history and purpose. discern the plain meaning of words, courts examine dictionary usages. 1 6 Webster's Third New International Dictionary lists four definitions for the adjective "other," three of which are pertinent: la: being the one (as of two or more) left: not being the one (as of two or more) first mentioned or of primary concern: remaining ... 2a: not the same: different...
3: more, additional.'"
Whether understood as "remaining," "different," or "additional," the word "other" captures all varieties of taxes aside from poll taxes. In addition, the disjunctive coordinator "or," which precedes "other tax," indicates that the category "other tax" must include items different from those in the "poll tax" category."' A reading of "other" as restrictive-that is, as "poll tax or other [similar] tax"-matches neither the word's expansive plain meaning nor its structural place within the text. Because "other" is inclusive, income taxes qualify as an "other tax."
When interpreting the Constitution's plain meaning, courts will also consider the meaning of words in their broader context. 118 Webster's Third defines "or" as "used as ,a function word to indicate (1) an alternative between different or unlike things, states, or actions." Webster's Third at 1585 (cited in note 115). Alternate uses that indicate, for example, "the synonymous, equivalent, or substitute character of two words or phrases" are too restrictive because they render ineffective the phrase "or other tax." See Knowlton v Moore, 178 US 41,87 (1900) (noting the "elementary canon of construction which requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution").
119 Cohens, 19 US at 398 ("In interpreting a provision of the Constitution, every part of the article must be taken into view and that construction adopted which will consist with its words and promote its general intention.").
120 US Const Amend XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
[74:1549 maries are simply an exemplar." ' Because courts read "other" expansively in the second phrase, it must have a consistent meaning in the first. Although different parts of the Constitution have been interpreted to use "other" restrictively,"n the internal structure of the Twenty-fourth Amendment necessitates an expansive reading. Therefore, "other tax" includes levies beyond simple poll taxes, and income taxes fall within the Twenty-fourth Amendment's purview.
2. Congressional intent.
Although the unambiguous plain meaning of the Twenty-fourth Amendment appears dispositive, courts often turn to other modes of interpretation to augment the text." One such mode analyzes congressional history to discern the intent of a provision's authors.'' The Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafting history indicates that the Amendment's authors sought two goals: to "strip[] away more of the legal camouflage that was sheltering discrimination" against Southern blacks and to increase voter turnout.1
25
The Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafters actively sought to remedy invidious racial discrimination in some states' regulation of the franchise. '26 On the floor of Congress, the debate over the Twentyfourth Amendment highlighted the race angle. Southern senators and representatives decried the measure as an abrogation of states' rights and a poorly disguised effort by Northern politicians to win the urban African-American vote. In turn, these Northern politicians responded by alleging that the Southerners' federalism arguments merely masked base racial bias.'" Ending racial discrimination was a purpose of the Amendment, but it was not the sole purpose.
The House Judiciary Committee's report on the Twenty-fourth Amendment exposes a second goal: to increase voter participation in general. The report claims that:
[T]hese five States which still require payment of a poll tax were among the seven States with the lowest voter participation in the 1960 presidential election.
While it is true that the amount of poll tax now required to be paid in the several States is small and imposes only a slight economical obstacle for any citizen who desires to qualify in order to vote, nevertheless, it is significant that the voting in poll tax States is relatively low as compared to the overall population which would be eligible.. (describing the targets of tax evasion prosecutions as only those with very large amounts of unpaid tax at stake, which implies a predominantly white target population). Therefore, any intent of the Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafters to prevent the abrogation of blacks' voting produced substantial increases in the proportion of both blacks and whites who voted.' ° Disenfranchising tax felons subtracts from the pool of eligible voters, while preventing tax felon disenfranchisement adds to that pool."' Because neither choice produces a neutral effect, an expansive reading of "other tax," a reading that precludes tax felon disenfranchisement, better meshes with the intent of the Twentyfourth Amendment's drafters.
The Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafters also clarified an explicit purpose for the phrase "other tax." The drafters intended the phrase to be broadly prophylactic, according to the House report on template that the phrase "other tax" might reach federal income taxes, they crafted a provision that addressed the substance of the poll tax problem rather than the mere form of contemporary poll taxes. " ' By inserting catchall language, the drafters chose to err on the side of expansive voting rights. A narrow reading of "other tax" allocates the risks of interpretive error in a way that directly contravenes the intent of the Amendment's drafters. The Twenty-fourth Amendment's drafting history, like its plain meaning, therefore supports a broad interpretation of the phrase "other tax" and the conclusion that tax felon disenfranchisement is unconstitutional. It is impossible to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form, without varying the substance. It is treating a prohibition which is general, as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the forbidden thing. All must perceive, that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax on the article itself.
Brown v Maryland, 25 US (12 Wheat) 419, 444 (1827).
V. INTERPRETING THE TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT
The text, structure, and drafting history of the Twenty-fourth Amendment imply that the Amendment's broad voting rights guarantee bars states from disenfranchising tax felons. This conclusion, however, stands in tension with present-day understandings of the Twentyfourth Amendment's social, legal, and historical role, which casts the Amendment as substantively narrow in scope.' 34 To remedy this incongruity, courts should apply an additional interpretive layer when analyzing the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Before addressing the text, structure, and drafting history of the Amendment, courts should locate the provision within its social, political, and historical context, within a "preliminary frame" that guides the application of more conventional modes of interpretation. The Twenty-fourth Amendment's preliminary frame indicates that the Amendment represents a narrow intervention against a specific set of practices that do not include tax felon disenfranchisement. Therefore, courts should construe the Amendment to permit tax felon disenfranchisement. ' A. The Role of the Twenty-fourth Amendment Present-day views of the Twenty-fourth Amendment promote an understanding of the Amendment's social, legal, and historical role as fundamentally limited. Scholars often cast the Twenty-fourth Amendment as a product of the Civil Rights Movement, as a sign of Whiggish progress towards a certain type of broad-based democracy. In terms of social and historical context, the Twenty-fourth Amendment fits with contemporaneous efforts to eliminate constraints on voting rights such as "literacy tests, understanding clauses, pauper exclusions, and good character provisions"; "durational residency qualifications"; "language barriers"; and "racial gerrymander [ing] . ' ' 3 ' The 1960s political rights milieu also generated the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which widened the franchise by extending the vote to, respectively, residents of Washington, D.C., and United 134 Scholars have noted an analogous tension involving Rehnquist's rigidly formalistic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in Ramirez. See note 34.
135 Given that cheaper and easier routes to re-enfranchisement exist (and that tax felons may not care much about voting anyway), it seems somewhat implausible that a plaintiff will press this issue in court.
136 See Keyssar, The Right to Vote at 281-82 (cited in note 8); Klarman, From Jim Crow at 340 (cited in note 8) (noting the effect of a "racial gerrymander"). See also Keyssar, The Right to Vote at ch 8 (cited in note 8).
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States citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. 37 This concerted expansion of the electorate, however, had (and has) clear political and social limits, as evidenced by the persistent exclusion of convicted felons from voter rolls."' The Twenty-fourth Amendment represents not a broad statement of rights, but rather a closely titrated effort to remedy a specific perceived problem.
The Twenty-fourth Amendment's limited effect on the law both at ratification and at present supports an understanding of the Amendment as a discrete intervention at a specific historical moment.
Arguably, the Twenty-fourth Amendment's principal effect was to bring "the stragglers"-the five holdout poll tax states-"into line"
with the majority. 3 9 Further mitigating this effect is the strong possibility that "the outliers might not have held out much longer against the nearly unanimous opposing consensus even if there had been no constitutional amendment.' ' .. By 1964, the Amendment was legal "window-dressing," a trophy for the hard-fought social battles over civil rights."' The ascendancy of Fourteenth Amendment voting rights under Harper and the paucity of case law on the Twenty-fourth Amendment indicate that the Twenty-fourth Amendment has little lasting import beyond its initial symbolic value. 4 ' It seems patently incongru-ous for the Amendment's lasting legal legacy to be to exempt tax felons-a relatively minor subcategory of criminals-from the application of otherwise-constitutional disenfranchisement statutes. Mechanical interpretation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment therefore produces a result that radically alters the Amendment's social, legal, and historical meaning, as understood from a present-day vantage point.' 43
B. Preliminary Frames and Constitutional Interpretation
The tension between the Twenty-fourth Amendment's social, legal, and historical role and the Amendment's meaning under traditional interpretive modes can be remedied by addressing the general scope of the Amendment before invoking more conventional methods. This "preliminary frame" guides the application of text, structure, drafting history, purpose, and other methods of interpretation by limiting the types of interpretive questions that can be asked about the Twenty-fourth Amendment. In particular, a preliminary frame asks whether the Amendment, as a whole, should be viewed broadly or narrowly."' More generally, the preliminary frame categorizes "some of the Constitution's provisions ... as enacting fairly abstract principles, and others as enacting quite concrete rules.''. This type of preliminary frame avoids a principal peril of rote interpretation: that the Constitution will be inappropriately read "with mathematical nicety to logical extremes.' 4 . In addition, the preliminary frame clarifies the stakes of interpretation by focusing debate on the Amendment's functional role and away from the intellectual merit of specific modes of interpretation." ' The idea of a preliminary frame is not unprecedented; indeed, such a concept offers a possible explanation for areas of constitutional law that appear disconnected from the Constitution's text. Judicial interpretations of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments provide examples of these apparently extratextual readings. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." By its plain language, the Ninth Amendment recognizes the existence of federally enforceable substantive rights beyond those explicated by the Constitution. "8 The Supreme Court, however, understands the Amendment to merely affirm that the Constitution makes a positive grant of enumerated powers to the federal government.' 9 It "is simply a rule about how to read the Constitution"' ' 0 and "far removed from affirming any one of [those other, unenumerated rights].'.' A preliminary frame analysis helps reconcile the Court's Ninth Amendment jurisprudence with conventional modes of constitutional interpretation. Framing the Ninth Amendment as a fundamentally narrow provision-and not a broad grant of individual rights -constrains the range of textual meanings that the Amendment can support. " ' touch antecedent established practices, such as felon disenfranchisement, and would abrogate only 1964 poll taxes and prospective measures of a similar sort with a similar effect. In light of present-day understandings of the Amendment-and in contrast to present-day understandings of prototypically broad constitutional amendments, such as the Fourteenth Amendment-an entirely narrow reading is most appropriate. 57 Because a preliminary frame casts the Twenty-fourth Amendment as narrow and rule-like, ' 58 the Twenty-fourth Amendment's phrase "other tax" should not encompass income taxes.
CONCLUSION
The text, structure, and drafting history of the Twenty-fourth Amendment notwithstanding, the Amendment's ban on any "poll tax or other tax" should not include income taxes, leaving tax felon disenfranchisement constitutional. This extratextual interpretation, which stems from the application of a "preliminary frame" that considers the Twenty-fourth Amendment's scope in light of its social, legal, and historical role, ameliorates the tension between felon disenfranchisement laws and the Twenty-fourth Amendment. In addition, the concept of a preliminary frame sheds light on other apparently extratextual interpretations of the Constitution, such as those involving the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments. Indeed, preliminary frames may even provide useful guidance in addressing parts of the Constitution that produce divergent meanings under different interpretive modes.
